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Summary 
Mission driven businesses—here defined as businesses that are managed to produce 
financial returns alongside intended social or environmental benefits—face many 
challenges as they grow past the “angel” stage and scale up into fully-fledged 
corporations. These include all the developmental challenges met by ordinary for-
profit businesses and, in addition, the unique challenge of preserving mission as they 
grow. An emerging body of research, plus an increasing level of first-hand 
management experience across several sectors, reveals that governance offers a 
framework that can help blended bottom line companies manage some threats to 
mission and avoid “mission drift” during the growth stage.  
 
Drawing together current learning from the field, sector research and material 
gathered through interviews with a number of leading practitioners, this paper seeks 
to demonstrate some ways mission-driven businesses can use governance to manage 
the pressures of change and preserve mission as they scale. It highlights a number of 
factors that can lead to erosion of mission in the growth stage, including changes to 
legal form, changes in leadership, especially in the role of the founder, and changes to 
board composition, in particular the advent of influential investors in decision-making 
roles. And it suggests how, through governance practice, businesses can develop the 
internal governance structures, processes and systems that will help them cope with 
the pressures of growth and, at the same time, work to embed mission in the DNA of 
the developing organization.  
Introduction 
The way the world does business is changing before our eyes. Once the ideal of a few 
visionaries, the concept of the socially and environmentally beneficial company—one 
that produces a blended value1 result of financial returns and impact—now seems 
attainable to businesspeople and investors alike. Businesses conceived of and 
intentionally managed as socially beneficial entities are springing up everywhere. 
Sustainability is now on the agenda for multi-national corporations and a widening 
pool of private, mainstream and institutional investors are seeking opportunities in 
what is a rapidly expanding marketplace.  
 
Despite its growing popularity, there are still many challenges when it comes to 
establishing the blended value approach as a standard way of conducting business. 
Some of these have to do with large-scale market infrastructure issues. For example, 
the G8 Social Impact Investment taskforce identified issues such as regulatory 
barriers, a lack of sector data and the need for better metrics, all of which must be 
addressed at national and international levels (Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 
2014).  
 
                                                     
1 Introduced in 2000, Blended Value is the concept that value is fundamentally non-divisible, 
consisting of financial, social and environmental components integrated within a single value 
proposition, potentially generated by any organization (non-profit, for-profit or hybrid) and capital 
type (philanthropic, near market and market rate). A complementary concept, Shared Value, 
introduced in December 2006, focuses primarily upon larger corporations and is viewed by many as 
distinct from, yet an extension of, corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. 
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Some of the challenges, however, have their origins—and their solutions—much 
closer to home. They lie within the organizational structures, leadership and decision-
making processes of the businesses themselves. This brief issue paper concerns itself 
one of these: Mission-drift and what blended value businesses can do to keep it from 
happening as they grow and develop. 
Mission drift and the pressures of growth 
Mission-drift, the loss of focus on social and environmental aims, has been identified 
as a problem for blended value businesses (Alnoor, Battilana & Mair, 2014). A 
business that starts life as a social enterprise, in which mission-related goals go hand-
in-hand with business ones, often ends up, somewhere down the road, as an ordinary 
business in which only financial performance really matters. Social and 
environmental impact may still be a superficial part of the brand, but it is no longer 
central to operations or meaningfully reflected in performance results. How does this 
happen? 
 
In some ways, the recent popularity of social investing may be a contributing factor. 
The increased interest from mainstream and institutional investors in managing for 
sustained impact offers socially beneficial businesses new possibilities for growth. 
But even as the availability of investment capital makes it possible for them to realize 
scale, the pressures that come with scaling may act to encourage (or, in some cases, 
force) blended value businesses to consider financial factors over mission, leading to 
mission drift or even the abandonment of mission in favor of the pursuit of financial 
performance.  
 
The potential to prioritize finance over impact factors may consistently be at play in 
the management of blended value businesses. Yet it is as companies seek to grow—to 
attain greater scale—that they appear to be particularly vulnerable to mission drift.  
 
Organizational development literature has established that scaling brings with it 
multiple challenges to any business (Greiner, 1972). These include increased 
reporting and accountability demands, the need to formalize management and 
operating processes, and the need to develop complex systems, re-invent strategy and 
expand operations. Changes to management at this point may mean significant 
changes in overall organizational leadership, especially when it comes to the role of 
the founder, but also in the constitution of board membership. New influences, in 
particular the presence of powerful investors with voting positions on the board, bring 
new pressures to bear on strategic direction and organizational culture. 
 
These factors make the growth stage a critical time for ordinary for-profits; for 
blended value businesses, the challenges of scaling are even greater. Not only must 
they clear all the hurdles confronting traditional for-profit entities as they carry out the 
intense work of expansion, but they have to preserve social and environmental impact 
while they pursue organizational sustainability.  
 
This returns us to the fundamental question:  
 
What can blended value businesses do on a practical level to protect mission 
through the critical scaling stage of organizational development? 
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Governance: a framework for embedding mission 
In this paper, we attempt to demonstrate some of the ways governance—“the systems 
and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control and 
accountability of an organization” (Cornforth & Brown, 2014)—may provide an 
answer to this question.  
 
When the topic of governance comes up, there’s a common belief that it relates 
primarily to issues of compliance—what businesses need to do in order to satisfy 
regulatory requirements, tick boxes and file necessary paperwork. In fact, governance 
provides the means for organizations to develop the top-level strategic leadership that 
allows for growth and makes for success in a competitive environment.  
 
Good governance is key to the health of all businesses. For companies with a mission 
component to their strategy, such as non-profits, social enterprises and blended value 
businesses, governance is even more important because it helps them keep a grip on 
mission. It is the “internal means through which governing boards and managers 
ensure that organizations remain focused on their social goals” (Chait, Ryan & 
Taylor, 2005). A growing number of investors and corporate managers, supported by 
an evolving body of academic research2, now understand that the blended value 
businesses that “get” governance and learn to use it as a tool for strengthening 
leadership, strategy and operations have a greater likelihood of staying ahead of the 
curve when it comes to developing an organization that can withstand the stresses of 
growth with mission intact.  
 
Governance offers a range of opportunities to preserve mission and embed it at the 
heart of strategy through the often-turbulent scaling stage. It provides a framework for 
creating the internal structures and processes needed to balance a range of new forces 
and influences that crop up at this time. It eases the transition from founder-centric 
small enterprise to a more mature, multi-stakeholder corporation (Alnoor, Battilana & 
Mair, 2014). And it helps businesses factor in mission when developing the strategic 
systems—such as engagement, monitoring and reporting—that will allow them to 
deliver both profit and benefit.  
 
Not only does skill in governance have internal benefits for blended value businesses, 
it brings external benefits as well: Governance is now emerging as a key factor in how 
investors perceive an organization’s potential for investment. 
 
Poor corporate governance was, we now know, one of the chief causes of the 2008 
financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009).
 
Trust Across America, an initiative to restore the 
trust in business, includes governance as one of five areas to address for rebuilding 
trust, goodwill and credibility across the business sector. Partly as a result of lessons 
learned from the crash and its aftermath, the “G” in ESG—governance—has become 
one of the most most-studied aspects of the three measures of sustainability. It is now, 
rightly, the preoccupation of many investors.    
 
                                                     
2 A review of research on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper. To learn more, 
please see the research and publications pages of the United States Social 
Investment Forum (US-SIF) http://www.ussif.org/pubs. 
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Investors see good governance as a mark of competent management as well as an 
indicator of potential future success (Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors, 2012). 
They are eager to understand governance factors because they see them as a means for 
mitigating financial and, importantly, extra-financial risk. For these reasons, the 
governance practices of all kinds of companies are coming under increasing scrutiny 
by investors. A poor record on governance, or the failure to provide credible 
information about governance, are top reasons for investors to say “no” to one 
investment opportunity while they say “yes” to another (EY Climate Change and 
Sustainability Services, 2014). Blended value businesses at all stages of development 
would be wise, therefore, to raise their governance game and do more to meet investor 
demands for more governance transparency. 
Raising awareness of governance 
Corporate governance is a large and complex subject that touches every aspect of 
organizational activity. When it comes to the governance of blended value businesses 
this already-complex topic is made even more challenging by introducing the question 
of mission. Our sector is learning rapidly, but the implications for governance in what 
is a relatively new model for doing business are only beginning to be fully understood 
(Spear, Cornforth & Aiken, 2009).
 
 
 
This short paper is, then, not intended as a comprehensive guide to good governance 
practice for blended value businesses. Rather, it assumes that companies will be 
familiar with standard corporate governance practice and have access to guidance on 
such fundamental governance issues as establishing governing boards, structures and 
systems. Those seeking a more thorough overview of governance should start with 
The Governance of Social Enterprises: Managing Your Organization for Success 
(Achleitner et al., 2012) published by the Schwab Foundation for Social 
Entrepreneurship. Additional resources are cited throughout this paper. 
 
Our purpose in this paper is primarily to raise awareness of governance as a means of 
addressing some of the factors that can lead to mission drift during the growth stage in 
for-profit businesses with a mission component. Our target audience includes social 
entrepreneurs, social enterprise accelerators and impact-oriented investors who seek 
to support mission preservation in businesses as they grow. It is our hope that 
government agencies developing the field of “profit with purpose” business, as well 
as MBA programs training the business leaders of tomorrow, will also find the 
following report of use. Finally, the report’s insights may prove useful to governance 
consultants and trainers who work directly with the boards of blended value 
businesses.  
The contents of this paper 
For the benefit of this audience, our paper highlights certain innovations in mission-
friendly governance practice. Some of these are arising in the blended value business 
sector where field experience and research are beginning to reveal practical lessons 
and mission supportive legal forms are evolving. Other lessons are emerging 
elsewhere:  
 
 From the non-profit sector, where mission stewardship has always been a 
governance responsibility. 
 From technology start-ups. In common with social enterprises, these tend to 
have passionate founders who, though they bring vision and energy to their 
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young companies, can become a source of governance challenges when the 
business starts to grow. 
 From mainstream corporations, where the rise of sustainability and ESG 
integration is changing the way managers and investors are engaging with 
extra-financial performance, with governance implications. 
 
In Section I: Governance Lessons from Leading Impact Funds, we begin by exploring 
the lessons that can be applied to mission-driven businesses from the Mission First 
and Last model identified in a study of successful impact investing funds.
 
Section II: 
Choosing a Legal Form That Supports Mission provides an overview of the mission-
protective legal forms currently available to businesses and explains why, though 
valuable, they are not in themselves sufficient to protect mission as organizations 
grow.  
 
Section III: Establishing Mission Leadership at Board Level examines some of the 
governance challenges the growth phase brings to blended value businesses, including 
the need to transfer mission responsibility from the founder to the governing board 
and the importance of finding a mission-wise chair to lead the board.  Section IV: 
Challenges of a Changing Board Composition deals with the dynamics of introducing 
investors into strategic decision-making roles, and highlights strategies for keeping 
these influential people supportive of mission.  
 
Section V: Performance Monitoring for Mission shows the importance of tracking 
mission performance alongside financial performance and gives some pointers on 
how to set up a useful mission monitoring system at board level. Section VI: 
Reporting for Mission discusses how the new forms of integrated reporting can help 
protect mission, and outlines the board’s role in choosing reporting strategies that 
keep the business on track to deliver a double bottom line. Finally, Section VII: 
Formalizing Board and Executive Accountability for Mission draws lessons from the 
large corporations that are embedding sustainability into governance systems by 
taking steps to make executives and the governing board increasingly accountable for 
performance.  
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Table 1: The evolution of governance through stages of development 
Stage of Development What’s happening in the 
organization? 
Governance profile 
Start-up stage 
 
Blended value businesses usually start 
with an individual or very small team 
who share an idea about using business 
to bring benefits to society.  
 
Governance at this stage is 
negligible if existent at all. 
Decisions are typically made by 
the founder or founders. 
Founders are accountable only to 
themselves and any early sources 
of capital such as family, friends, 
and sympathetic small investors. 
Mission is at the heart of the 
business.  
“Angel” stage Early investors, often impact funds, 
intermediaries and angel investors get 
involved. There’s commonly a 
philanthropic edge to investment and a 
clear relationship between mission 
performance and capital support.  
 
With the first investing partner, 
the organizations takes its first 
steps in governance, formally 
constituting a board of directors 
and beginning the process of 
establishing formal governance 
systems. The founder often 
serves as board chairman at this 
stage. Early board members 
often include friends and family 
but may include early, mission-
friendly investors. In preparation 
for the next stage, board 
members with strategic expertise 
should be recruited now. 
Monitoring, documentation and 
reporting begins in earnest, with 
an eye to future growth and 
investment.  
Growth stage With demonstrated growth potential, the 
business looks beyond the support of 
family, friends and early stage mission 
investors. Securing capital may mean 
reaching out to venture capitalists and 
other mainstream investors, or changing 
the terms of involvement of early 
investors. New investors may be mission 
neutral: Less interested in the social 
benefit than business opportunity. Other 
partners, such as government agencies, 
may come into the picture, bringing 
different sets of priorities. 
 
Sophisticated governance 
processes and systems, including 
monitoring of mission and 
financial performance, are 
needed to handle the increasing 
operational complexity, and 
escalating accountability and 
reporting demands. The 
organization may adopt a new 
legal structure. The board may 
be restructured to ensure that 
there are a majority of 
independent directors and to 
make room for directors 
appointed by investors. An 
independent chair should be 
appointed. The founder may 
remain active in a leadership 
role, but  responsibility for both 
mission delivery and financial 
accountability shifts to the 
governing board and top 
management.  
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Section I: Governance Lessons from Leading Impact Funds 
In our book, The Impact Investor: Lessons in Leadership and Strategy for 
Collaborative Capitalism (Clark, Emerson & Thornley, 2014), we identified four key 
elements distinguishing the most successful impact investing funds. We found a 
central element of successful impact investing to be the concept of “Mission First and 
Last”, an approach that incorporates mission into operational strategy and links it 
securely to financial performance.  
 
Mission First and Last involves establishing financial and mission intentionality early 
in the fund’s lifecycle, then using organizational structure and strategy, along with 
tracking and reporting, to keep mission at the heart of operations and ensure the 
delivery of both mission and financial performance at the end of the investment cycle.  
 
In our research, governance emerged as the means for realizing Mission First and Last 
in successful impact funds. It plays a vital role at every stage of organizational 
development, but particularly in establishing “mission-protective” governance 
structures and incentivizing mission delivery across the organization.  
 
 Through governance, impact funds were able to foster “internal alignment” by 
enacting organizational strategies that ensured that the entire staff, board and 
other stakeholders “are on the same page and working collaboratively toward 
shared goals,” including mission-related goals.  
 
 Governance was effective in creating “external alignment”— communicating 
and collaborating with forces outside the organization, including stakeholders 
such as regulators, policymakers, investors, investees and community 
members.  
 
 Governance structure and strategy were found to reflect the way a company 
viewed its own extra-financial mission, and that self-definition had an impact 
on the way the organization was seen by outsiders. Our research underscored 
the importance of thinking “clearly about the messages that (a) particular 
governance strategy sends, and the incentives it creates.”  
 
Impact funds and mission-driven businesses are far from identical, yet there are 
important similarities between them and lessons to be drawn from the one to the 
other. Like impact funds, mission-driven businesses must forge clear connections 
between mission intentionality and accountability while demonstrating both financial 
and impact performance. Like them, they are typically working with a range of 
stakeholders, including a number of influential investors, who may have highly 
diverse motivations and expectations.  
 
In both cases, governance holds the key to succeeding at what can be a tricky 
balancing act of keeping mission central to strategy while simultaneously delivering 
financial performance.  Through governance, both businesses and funds can achieve 
internal and external alignment around mission and ensure that mission remains 
central to a company’s identity as well its reputation and brand. 
 11 
Section II: Choosing a Form That Supports Mission 
Choosing a legal form is often a first step in establishing a business capable of 
delivering both on mission and financial performance. Legal form determines 
governance structure to a significant degree, and so the choice of form has profound 
implications for governance practice and the organization’s ability to prioritize 
mission. So key are forms that the recent Social Investment Taskforce Mission 
Alignment working group focused exclusively on legal forms as a means of creating 
“profit-with-purpose” businesses of the future (Mission Alignment Working Group, 
2014). 
 
Recognizing their importance, the social investment sector has worked to develop 
specialized legal forms intended to foster the growth of blended value business 
models. Over the past decade, a variety of networks have been created to promote 
mission-driven enterprise development through diverse legal forms. These include 
The Fourth Sector Network, Social Venture Network, BALLE and others. As a result 
of these efforts, there are now a number of specialized legal forms, some of which 
explicitly safeguard mission and, crucially, give directors protection for making 
decisions for extra-financial reasons.  
 
Having a choice of suitable, mission-supportive forms fulfils an important function 
for blended value businesses since research indicates that changes to legal form are a 
natural part of their pattern of growth. As governance researcher Judith Mayer pointed 
out in a recent interview,  
 
“What I see among social enterprises is a lifecycle, an evolution. Many start as non-
profits but then they want to scale the business and so they seek out for-profit 
investors. At this point, they need to change forms. In this way, a non-profit may turn 
into a for-profit and then, in the end, it might turn into a hybrid that combines both 
forms” (Mayer, 2014).  
 
Each of the specialized legal forms has its proponents and critics and a full discussion 
of their pros and cons is beyond the scope of this brief.3 Yet each represents an 
attempt to provide a legal basis for blended value businesses that seek to put mission 
and financial performance on a more equal footing. Additionally, by adopting one of 
them, businesses send the message to investors, the public and other stakeholders that 
they are serious about delivering benefit with profit.  
Specialized Legal Forms 
Benefit Corporation 
Currently recognized in 28 US states and the District of Columbia, the benefit 
corporation form offers legal protection to the company’s social goals by mandating 
considerations apart from profit. It gives company directors the secured legal 
protection they need to consider the interest of all stakeholders, not only the 
shareholders who elected them.   
                                                     
3 For a fuller consideration of the question, see Richard Cohen’s article, Some Unanswered Questions 
About Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and Social Enterprise More Generally. Retrieved from 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/management/24088-some-unanswered-questions-about-benefit-
corporations-l3cs-and-social-enterprise-more-generally.html. 
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 Specific societal and environmental “benefits” are included in articles of 
incorporation and pursued as part of corporate mission. 
 The board of directors and officers consider the impact of every corporate 
decision on those societal and environmental benefits. 
 The company adopts third-party standards against which the board is required 
to measure its achievement of the prescribed societal and environmental 
benefits. 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company 
The L3C is a hybrid business form that provides a way to combine a socially 
beneficial mission with a for-profit business entity. A variation on the Limited 
Liability Company (LLC), the L3C is designed to take advantage of both non-profit 
and for-profit sources of capital, specifically Program Related Investments (PRIs) 
from foundations, by using a tiered capital structure.  
 
The potential advantage of the L3C form is that it’s highly flexible, allowing the 
structure of social businesses to be tailored to combine mission and financial 
performance. However, the IRS has still not ruled whether private foundation 
investments in L3Cs qualify as PRIs. In 2014, the state of North Carolina abolished 
the L3C due to doubts regarding federal acknowledgement. 
Social Purpose Corporation  
Formerly called the Flexible Purpose Corporation (FPC), the Social Purpose 
Corporation (SPC) is a corporate form only available in California. Like the FPC it 
grew from, the SPC was designed to provide companies with flexibility to pursue 
charitable and public purpose activities as well as profit. New amendments in 2014 
require directors to consider factors such as the overall goals of the corporation and 
the social purposes stated in its articles in their decision-making. 
Community Interest Company (CIC) 
A Community Interest Company is a form of company specifically created for the 
social enterprise sector in the UK. CICs are required by law to have provisions in their 
articles of association to enshrine their social purpose, specifically an “asset lock”, 
which restricts the transfer of assets out of the CIC and a cap on the maximum 
dividend and interest payments it can make. A CIC may convert into a charity or into 
a Community Benefit Society or it may voluntarily dissolve but once established it 
may not convert into a standard limited company.  
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Innovating With Standard Forms 
In addition to the specialized legal forms, the practice of adapting standard corporate 
structures is beginning to gain currency the social enterprise and mission-driven 
business sector, especially among companies that are seen to have significant growth 
potential.  
 
One such approach involves creating tandem structures. Tandem structures establish 
two distinct legal entities, one non-profit, one for-profit, within a single organization. 
They are distinct from legal forms such as the benefit corporation and the L3C, which 
combine non-profit and for-profit characteristics within a single legal entity and are 
thus often called “hybrid” forms. Tandem structures are typically tailor-made 
depending upon the charity and the business. They can be legally complex, and 
consequently expensive, both in structural formation and in operation. (One 
consultant we interviewed reported providing more than $750, 000 worth of pro-bono 
counsel to help two organizations establish a single tandem structure).  
 
The Rise of the “Dissenting Hybrid” 
Many social enterprises identify either as pure non-profits or pure for-
profits and consequently they adopt the governance structures and 
practices typical of these forms. A recent study of governance in social 
enterprises identifies as set of new types of social enterprise, the 
“dissenting hybrids”, organizations that are creating novel board structures 
and governance systems.  
 
 Benetech, an organization providing technology solutions to 
disabled and marginalized people, includes representatives of both 
business and social sectors on their board and makes it clear that 
the board is responsible for ensuring social mission as well as 
financial viability. 
 Compartamos, a microfinance organization, splits accountability 
within the board. 
 Homeless World Cup, an organization addressing homelessness, 
established a single governing board to oversee and monitor the 
activities of two legally separated organizational entities, one for-
profit and one non-profit. The same board has back-to-back 
meetings dealing with each part of the organization. 
  
These innovations reflect the commitment of these organizations to 
differentiate themselves from traditional for-profits and non-profits and to 
become, at every level, authentically new kinds of organizations. The early 
adopters of these new frameworks may be offering us early glimpses of 
future governance approaches that protect mission through the stages of 
development. 
(Mair, Mayer & Lutz, 2014) 
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Tandem entities typically have two separate governing boards, each one working, 
respectively, along conventional for-profit or non-profit lines. The relationship 
between these two boards, including their duties with regard to mission 
accountability, are defined in the company bylaws. Overlap of directors between the 
two boards is often built in an effort to ensure that the two entities “will stay aligned 
in their parallel missions” (Mittermeir & Neugart, 2011).  Popularized by high tech 
start-ups, tandem structures are becoming more common among scaling social 
enterprises and they are proving attractive to investors. 
 
In another development, standard-from corporations are seeking BCorp certification 
in an effort to cement their status as mission driven or socially beneficial businesses. 
BCorps are companies that have qualified for certification by the non-profit, BLab, 
not to be confused with the benefit corporation, which is a legal form.  
 
The BCorp is not a legal form and extra-financial reporting requirements are lower 
than for benefit companies. Yet to attain certification, companies must meet basic 
standards in mission governance practice. These include formulating a mission 
statement and establishing a board of directors (beyond the management team) that 
meets a minimum number of times per year. It remains to be seen whether these 
standards go far enough to maintain extra-financial issues as a priority for BCorp 
certified businesses as they mature. Yet the certification process does encourage 
companies to take first steps toward establishing durable mission governance systems.  
 
Meanwhile, the innovation of “founders’ preferred stock” offers yet another approach 
to safeguarding mission in the growth stage while using a standard corporate form or 
tandem structure (see box). 
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Why Forms Aren’t Enough to Preserve Mission 
Specialized legal forms and innovative tweaks to standard corporate forms can offer 
important structural support for mission governance in growing businesses. However, 
neither approach provides the whole answer to the question of mission survival in the 
growth stage.  
 
First, this is because companies may not use them. The new legal forms are still in an 
experimental phase and lack broad acceptance (Alnoor, Battilana & Mair, 2014). 
Many founders and governing boards still opt for traditional legal forms associated 
with non-profit and for-profit organizations, even though these forms may not meet 
their needs (Alnoor, Battilana & Mair, 2014). Investors, too, can show strong 
preferences for standard forms and will apply pressure to get investees to adopt them 
over ones that may be more mission-supportive (Johnson, 2014). 
 
Mission anchoring with founders’ preferred stock 
“There’s been a crying need for a middle solution when it comes to legal 
forms. We have prototyped a brand new structure that adapts an innovation 
created in 2008 called founders’ preferred stock.  
 
Founders’ preferred stock was originally created to provide founders with 
less-dilutive means for some liquidity prior to an exit transaction. It is 
becoming widely accepted by institutional investors in Silicon Valley start-ups. 
 
For social enterprises seeking mission-anchoring devices other than using 
new statutory models, we have crafted the mission into the articles and the 
bylaws and provided the founder’s preferred stock with negative control over 
changes to those provisions. The feature is similar to the negative control 
features, or veto power, typically granted to venture capital investors, albeit 
limited to changes to mission.  
 
This leaves the mission-anchoring decision in the hands of the founders, not 
the board or the shareholders in general. We’ve learned over time that this 
becomes a very valuable tool in negotiating what terms and exits are going to 
include. Yet it doesn’t put investors at risk for the ‘rogue founder’ as with 
other solutions such as super-voting stock. In fact, investors, including 
venture capitalists, are willing to fund into this model because they see it as 
part of the authentic brand they are creating for a millennial generation that 
really cares about social benefit” (Johnson, 2014).  
 
R. Todd Johnson,  
Partner and Practice Leader for Energy  
at Jones Day Partners 
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Second, adopting the new forms and approaches cannot, by itself, ensure mission 
preservation. According to the authors of a recent report on mission drift in hybrid 
organizations: 
 
 “…while newly introduced legal forms surface and try to speak to (the challenges of 
balancing mission and financial performance) social enterprises are unlikely to 
resolve them in the absence of explicit organizational governance processes and 
mechanisms that ensure that overall direction, control and accountability of the 
organization” (Alnoor, Battilana & Mair, 2014).  
 
In other words, adopting one of the specialized legal forms (or, we would add, 
adapting a standard one) may provide a starting point for creating an organization 
capable of protecting mission though stages of growth and development. However, 
only by establishing effective governance systems and practices can businesses of any 
kind reliably deliver on both mission and profit. In the sections that follow, we’ll 
discuss some of the reasons why this is the case, and highlight specific areas where 
mission stewardship can be built in to the processes of governance at the growth 
stage.  
Section III: Establishing Mission Leadership at Board Level 
The growth stage brings many challenges to blended value businesses and one of the 
most significant in terms of mission preservation may arise from the changes to 
leadership, especially to the role of the founder, that occur at this time.  
 
In all kinds of early-stage businesses, it’s common for the founder to provide 
leadership for all aspects of the organization (for example, he or she often serves 
simultaneously as CEO and board chairman). At the point when companies begin to 
grow, however, things change. From this moment onward, the involvement of the 
founder with the company must evolve as much as the firm itself does. At this point, 
formal governance systems and processes are created to take the place of the more 
informal ones used through the start-up phase. They build upon, and in some ways 
take over from, the individual leadership that has been so far provided by the founder. 
 
The transfer of responsibility from the charismatic individual to the collective 
governing board is one hallmark of a larger shift toward a more systemized, 
collaborative approach that needs to take place in all businesses as they grow (Clark, 
Emerson & Thornley, 2014). Yet for blended value businesses it can signal a risky 
moment for the mission. Often the founder’s leadership—his or her passion and 
vision—is what establishes the clear connection between the business and its mission 
in the first place. As the leadership shifts from founder to governing board, new ways 
need to be found to embed mission in the systems that will provide direction for the 
business from this point on.   
 
Shifting leadership from founder to board can be a challenge for all kinds of 
organizations but it may present a particular hurdle for mission-driven businesses. The 
figure of the founder looms large in the beneficial business world, above all in the for-
profit social enterprise sector, encouraged by a high number of prizes and programs 
aimed at individual entrepreneurs. Partly as a result of such well-meaning support 
efforts, some founders have risen to personal prominence alongside their blended 
value companies, becoming public faces for their businesses, ambassadors for their 
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brand with high media and field level visibility. At the growth stage, such over-
emphasis on founders can create the conditions under which so-called founder’s 
syndrome can arise. 
 
Founder’s syndrome—when founders try to hang on to control to the detriment of the 
organization—has been widely identified as an issue for non-profit and for-profit 
organizations. Recently, it’s emerged as a concern in the world of tech start-ups, 
where founder identification with the business or product is often as passionate and 
personal as that of social entrepreneurs (Linnell, 2004; Rowat, 2007).  
 
The common thread in founder’s syndrome across sectors is the type of person who 
establishes a non-profit, tech firm or mission-driven business. In all instances, these 
individuals tend to be driven people with a sense of personal mission that translates to 
their organization. They are, understandably, highly identified with the organizations 
they create, and this personal sense of commitment is often critical to bringing the 
organization through its early growth stages.  
 
 
 
There’s no doubt the founder is central in the early days of a blended value company. 
Later, during the growth stage, the he or she may retain leadership importance to a 
significant degree. We also heard anecdotal evidence that founders, with their 
charisma and persuasive ability, are key to attracting investor capital during the 
scaling stage (Johnson, 2014).  
 
Yet a founder who is over-identified with his or her business can become a problem at 
the growth stage. At this point, businesses need to replace individual leadership with 
corporate leadership, establishing the governance systems and processes required by 
larger, more complex, and necessarily more accountable, organizations. Founders 
who cannot or will not let go of personal influence when this moment arrives 
inadvertently endanger the future of their organization and its mission with their 
determination to stay in control.  
 
 
 
When the founder won’t embrace change  
“Strength of character is essential to driving the company through the many 
challenges to success, (but) it has a dark side. Many entrepreneurs believe they 
have all the answers and resist advice. They also over-rule decisions with which 
they do not agree…This behavior typically prevents the company from growing 
larger than the small size defined by what can be accomplished by a single, 
driven founder. Often it causes the company to become one of the 80% that fail 
to achieve their expectations.” (Rowat, 2007) 
 
David Rowat, from earlystagetechboards.com 
 
“Social enterprises and social businesses need even stronger boards and 
governance systems than for-profits do because they have more to protect in 
the mission and also have to deal with a more powerful sense of identification 
of the founder with the mission and the organization”. (Noble, 2014) 
Abigail Noble, World Economic 
Foundation 
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None of this may ultimately be the founder’s fault. In fact, rather than being seen as a 
failure on the part of the founder, founder’s syndrome is coming to be understood as a 
failure of a wider organizational leadership that allows a focus on the founder to 
distract from a focus on business strategy and mission (Schmidt, 2013). Businesses 
that neglect to create governance systems to provide adequate leadership through the 
growth stage create a climate where founder’s syndrome (among other issues) can 
adversely affect the business. 
 
Good governance practice provides a way for organizations to make a smooth (or at 
least smoother) transition from founder-led to governing board-led organization. 
Establishing a strong, unified, independent board with robust accountability and 
decision-making systems makes companies capable of avoiding some of the worst 
negative impacts of founder’s syndrome without destroying the positive benefit the 
founder brings to the organization or sacrificing the connection between mission and 
business established by the founder. 4 
 
Furthermore, with mission a signature element of founder leadership, it needs to be 
incorporated into the oversight, monitoring and reporting systems used by the 
governing board to keep the business on track to deliver a blended bottom line.  
 
Appointing a mission-wise Chair 
In early days of a blended value business, the founder often serves as board chairman 
(see Table 1). However, as the business grows and the role of founder changes, 
current thinking on organizational development practice says the organization should 
appoint an independent chair. 
 
There are many good reasons for this. Role separation resolves a potential conflict of 
interest arising from the fact that the CEO is the primary manager of a company and 
the chairman is the head of the board, which oversees management (Hodgeson, 2014).
 
Separating the roles strengthens the system of checks and balances and enhances the 
appearance (and hopefully, the reality!) of board independence. Splitting the roles is 
widely considered to be a best practice in corporate governance, though its benefits 
remain controversial in some circles, notably in parts of mainstream, corporate 
America. Many investors, however, tend to see an over-concentration of power in the 
hands of the founder as a potential strategic risk and favor role separation (Tonello, 
2011).
 
 
 
The mission relevance of the chair’s role has long been recognized in the non-profit 
sector where facilitating mission delivery, through managing and organizing the 
governing board’s mission-related work, has always been central to the chair’s role 
(Akpeki, 2006). Appointing a new board chair, then, may come to be seen as a 
potential milestone for mission preservation in blended value businesses.  
                                                     
4 Good governance has benefits for founders, too. The founders of social enterprises often endure inadequate remuneration, 
lack of benefits and unsustainable workloads for the sake of the mission. They shoulder the blame for organizational failures, 
sometimes unfairly. Good governance practice helps protect the founder from the excessive demands of an organization by 
providing the board oversight that ensures fair treatment and remuneration. 
 
 19 
 
As part of his or her practical, often mundane, role the chair exerts a powerful 
influence over the functioning of the governing board. The chair calls meetings and 
sets agendas, deciding what the board will discuss and when. He or she establishes 
committee structures, manages the flow of information to directors and facilitates 
discussions in the boardroom. S/he is often influential in recruiting and inducting new 
directors and staffing committees. Finally, board chairs often provide an important 
link between the board of directors and the chief executive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even this dry description should suggest the centrality of the chair’s role to successful 
corporate governance of the kind needed by growing businesses. Furthermore, the 
influence of the person fulfilling this role can be critical to the maintenance of mission 
within a thriving blended value venture. It stands to reason that, through choosing a 
chair who understands and backs the organization’s mission, organizations can 
strengthen mission stewardship in the boardroom and thus help avert mission drift.  
 
Commitment to carrying the torch of mission is only a starting point for a chair. The 
chair’s skills, personality and behavior will determine his or her effectiveness. A 
capable chair should come with first-hand knowledge of the sector or industry the 
business is operating in, proven leadership skills and an understanding of board 
process. In mission-driven businesses, the chair will also need a firm grasp of mission 
in the practical sense, experience in delivering mission in a business context and a 
commitment to ensuring that mission has its place in board discussion and decision-
making at every level (Shekshnia & Rowley, 2014). A mission-capable chair will 
know how to keep mission on the agenda, how to generate productive group 
discussion around mission and how to foster a positive board culture with a shared 
sense of purpose.  
Establishing an advisory committee 
Blended value businesses are often created to meet the needs of a particular group of 
stakeholders or beneficiaries. In the early stages of development, the business tends to 
engage more or less organically with these stakeholder groups. It’s not uncommon for 
Having the conversation 
“It’s important for boards to discuss the tension between fulfilling 
mission—which is linked to values—and carrying out business for profit. 
The two aren’t mutually exclusive, but there may be a tension between 
them.  
 
Boards need, first of all, to have a conversation about how they will 
respond when that tension surfaces in the course of board business. 
They need to agree how they will handle it. A good chair can facilitate 
that initial conversation and lead subsequent discussions to address 
tensions around business and mission when they emerge.” (Akpeki, 
2015) 
 
Tessé Akpeki, OnBoard Governance Consultant, Bates Wells Braithwaite 
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representatives from such stakeholder groups to occupy voting seats on the governing 
board of early-stage businesses (See Table 1). 
 
At the growth stage, investors often call for changes to the composition of boards in 
blended value businesses. In some cases, this may mean stakeholders lose their board 
positions to be replaced with “independent” directors approved by the investors. This 
process can contribute to a loss of what was once a natural connection between the 
mission-driven business and its stakeholders, and it can contribute to an erosion of 
mission focus at the board level of an organization (Ramani, 2015).   
 
One way mission-driven businesses can counteract the negative effects of this change 
is to establish an advisory committee or advisory board that includes stakeholders. 
Non-profit organizations frequently use this approach to involve beneficiary groups, 
clients and other stakeholders in strategy formation without giving them voting 
positions on the governing board (Achleitner et al., 2012).
 
An advisory board can help 
the organization gather information, keep in touch with impacts, and test stakeholder 
views while avoiding the trap of creating a board that’s too big or one whose 
members lack strategic skills. While lacking voting authority, at the very least such 
outside stakeholder groups may act as canaries in the coalmine, able to speak truth to 
power and call attention to corporate practices of any sort that are inconsistent with 
the broad mission and intent of the firm.  
 
Advisory boards can also offer a way to tap into specialist expertise that may be 
missing from the main board group. Advisory bodies convened temporarily around a 
specific project or issue can feed findings back to the larger board and help shape 
strategic decisions (Ferrari, 2014). Angel investors who don’t insist on a voting seat 
on the board may contribute insight and strategic expertise through participation an 
advisory board (Achleitner et al. 2012). 
 
To work effectively, advisory bodies need to form part of the overall governance 
strategy established at the highest board level. This means that they must be formally 
established, provided with a chair and a written brief, as well as criteria and processes 
for recruiting appropriate stakeholders. Safeguards need to be put in place to ensure 
the independence and accountability of the advisory board: it’s naturally possible for 
such bodies to become co-opted and rubber stamp actions of a main board and staff 
run astray. Finally, there need to be clear systems for accountably feeding advisory 
board views back into the strategic deliberations of the main board group.   
 
For more about establishing and staffing advisory boards, see Nancy Axelrod’s useful 
book Advisory Councils from BoardSource Publications. Though aimed at nonprofits, 
its guidance also has applications for blended value governing bodies. 5 
 
                                                     
5 Available online from BoardSource at http://www.amazon.com/Advisory-Councils-Committee-Series-5/dp/B002DBUFSQ 
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Section IV: Challenges of Changing Board Composition  
As we’ve seen, the growth stage typically brings significant changes to the 
composition of the governing boards of all businesses. For blended value businesses, 
these changes, if not handled strategically, can result in challenges to mission that 
come from the decision-making heart of the organization: The governing board itself.  
 
Ideally, a blended value business will begin developing its board during the 
supportive “angel” stage, recruiting mission-affirming board members with strategic 
skills (see Table 1). Yet many companies arrive at the growth stage with boards that 
are not prepared to meet the challenges of growth (Achleitner et al., 2012; Rowat, 
2007). They may consist of family members and friends of the founder who 
rubberstamp his or her decisions. Or they may include stakeholders who, though they 
bring a community perspective, lack the skills needed to handle the increased strategic 
and oversight demands that come with growth. 
 
The expansion of the social, sustainable and impact investing sector means different 
kinds of investors are now entering the market and, consequently, entering into 
financial relationships with blended value businesses (Asset Allocation Working 
Group, 2014).
 
Tapping into this new pool of capital—including venture capitalists, 
mainstream and institutional investors—can force significant changes to board 
composition and this, in turn, can have an impact on mission. 
 
Increasing investor activism is an important trend across the world of business 
(Conference Board, 2014). In a development that affects blended value companies as 
much as others, investors are now commonly demanding board seats as a condition 
for investment and so are exerting more influence over governance matters than ever 
before (Cloyd, 2015).
 
 
 
It’s becoming standard practice to require wide-scale board restructuring at the point 
of investment, too. This can mean that early-stage directors, especially friends and 
family of the founder, may find themselves pushed out of decision-making roles and 
replaced with investor-approved appointees. In an extreme development, so-called 
Making the best use of advisory boards  
“In my experience, the advisory board mechanism may work best if it’s project-
related.  When people are focusing on a project, they bring a lot more discipline. 
The most useful projects for advisory boards are those that address long-term 
strategic opportunities for the organization. For example, there might be people 
on our main board that have a general knowledge of a subject like impact 
investing, but the advisory board provides us with networks, connections and 
deep expertise. We can bring them in on an episodic basis. Once the decisions 
are made, they can move on to other things. Otherwise, the advisory board 
becomes a sort of governing board in waiting, and that’s not useful.” (Ferrari, 
2014) 
 
Pierre Ferrari, CEO of Heifer International 
and Board Member for Ben & Jerry’s 
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activist investors deliberately set out to change the leadership, strategy and operations 
of the companies they invest in (Gandel, 2015).  Although not yet in evidence in the 
social or impact investing sectors, the activists have been successful in traditional 
arenas. Their example is shifting the behavior of other investors and companies 
toward more activism. 
Active investors in the boardroom 
The trend toward investor activism means that accepting growth capital can lead to 
rapid, radical change in the boardroom and this, in turn, has an impact on mission. 
Contributing to the challenge is the collaborative nature of the financial arrangements 
for many blended value enterprises. These frequently involve a number of different 
investors, sometimes coming from very different organizational cultures. The 
resulting governing board may consequently be made up of voting members with 
widely varying objectives and requirements, some who are more forceful and 
uncompromising than others.  
 
All this underscores the volatility of governance at the growth stage and highlights the 
need to find ways to ensure mission protection through what can be a turbulent 
period. Companies must find ways to foster a shared, commonly embraced vision of 
the firm as well as finding pro-active ways to manage the participation of investors in 
the boardroom.  
 
As one approach, some blended value businesses are experimenting with governance 
arrangements that limit the influence of later-stage investors, for example offering 
non-voting shares to those “who are content with a more passive role”  (Achleitner et 
al, 2012). Staying private is another strategy for maintaining more control over who 
sits on the board, since private companies are not required to offer board seats to 
investors (Blank, 2013).  
 
However, the most effective way to build a governing board that will maintain 
mission as a company priority involves choosing the right investors in the first place.  
Choosing investors that align with mission 
With the trend toward more investor engagement appearing to continue, blended 
value businesses need to think very carefully before agreeing to partner with any 
investor. This emerged during the course of our research as one of the keys to 
protecting the mission through the growth phase.
 
 In order to ensure new investors 
will be supportive of mission aims, it’s vital to choose the right investment partners in 
the first place.  
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The governing board and senior management team have an important role to play in 
securing mission-aligned investors to help the business grow without losing a grip on 
mission. They can “actively seek out sympathetic investors” in the words of Pierre 
Ferrari, and market the business and mission to them. Before entering into any 
agreement, leaders seeking investment need to have a sense of how a potential 
investor will engage with the business, especially in terms of governance.  Knowing 
beforehand how potential investors are likely to act, and, crucially, interact with other 
governors in the boardroom, will help the leadership of blended value businesses 
make partnership choices that support mission in the long term.    
 
The trend toward more engagement is leading some investors to be more transparent 
with regard to their engagement with companies in their portfolio, spelling out their 
approach to voting and influencing in formal policies. Triodos, a leading, European 
social investor, sees engagement as a key element of its social and responsible 
investment strategy
 
 and publishes an annual engagement report, recording how it 
voted and influenced various issues (Triodos, 2014).  
 
Unfortunately, not all investors offer this level of transparency. In such cases, the 
leadership of the business will need to work with prospective investors to achieve 
greater disclosure. The Conference Board, a US governance think-tank, convened a 
taskforce on Corporate/Investor Engagement. Its findings recommend companies 
determine the following things about potential investors before accepting them as 
partners (Conference Board, 2014):  
 
 The investor’s governance principles and associated voting policies. 
 The investor’s engagement policies, including their choice to vote or 
otherwise engage in governance issues. 
 Information about whether the investor limits engagement depending on size 
of investment or the issues involved. 
 Information about investor decisions or obligations to outsource voting 
decisions or follow the recommendations of a third party, such as a proxy 
advisor. 
 Voting positions or decisions of the investor on specific issues. 
 
 
Seeking out the right investors 
“There hasn’t been enough attention paid to the composition of the 
shareholding of the stock. While you can’t forbid investors from taking an 
interest, you can actively seek out sympathetic investors and market yourselves 
to them. This has not been talked about enough: Making sure that the 
ownership of the company is actually aligned with its mission and values.” 
(Ferrari, 2014) 
 
Pierre Ferrari, CEO of Heifer International 
and Board Member for Ben & Jerry’s 
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Making term sheets mission-friendly 
Another approach to protecting mission at the point of investment involves company 
leadership working with investors to adapt term sheets (the summary documents 
outlining the material terms and conditions of any given investment opportunity) to 
support mission aims (Propper de Callejon, Campbell & Blumberg, 2014). This 
approach sees impact investors adapting term sheets to “bake in” mission by: 
 
 Requiring that the mission is articulated part of the term sheet, by-laws and 
Articles of Incorporation; 
 Restricting the use of invested funds to impact-generating activities; 
 Requiring the establishment of impact reporting systems of various types; 
 Requiring that as part of investor’s information rights, the company reports a 
predetermined set of impact performance indicators at a predetermined 
frequency; 
 Requiring that at least one board governor has oversight of impact; 
 Linking financial returns to achieved impact inversely: the investor forgives 
interest payments if the company achieves certain target outcomes; 
 Linking financial returns to achieved impact positively: the higher the impact, 
the higher the return to investors, as in the Pay for Success model; 
 Providing founders with a veto power to block an exit if they believe it to be in 
conflict with mission;  
 Using the Benefit Corporation or LLC forms to allow the governing board to 
give equal consideration to impact preservation when evaluating an exit for 
investors.  
 
 
Engaging with investors for the sake of mission 
With the trend toward greater investor activism, it’s more important than ever for 
blended value businesses to find effective ways to work with those who invest in 
 When to say no 
“Part of locking in mission may be saying no to the wrong kind of investor and 
instead pursuing strategies like loans or guarantees or finding alternative ways to 
scale such as simply bootstrapping it.” (Noble, 2014) 
Abigail Noble, World Economic 
Foundation 
 
Choosing the right investors 
“Choosing investors is a point where you can take action to protect mission. You 
may think, ‘We’ll just take the money,’ but you shouldn’t do it! You need to define 
the terms on which you’ll work. Influential investors can contribute to mission drift 
when they are too exit-oriented.” (Mayer, 2014) 
 
Judith Mayer, CNC Communications & Network Consulting AG 
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them.
 
Direct engagement—which involves the company pro-actively determining the 
priorities and concerns of investors and addressing them directly—is becoming more 
widespread across the business world (Ernst and Young, 2014). Though still in its 
early stages, according to the Conference Board, direct engagement “is likely to 
become a permanent, although less formal, part of governance of US public 
companies” (Conference Board, 2014).  
 
Direct engagement means businesses begin the conversation with investors, rather 
than waiting for them to bring up issues of concern, for example through a proxy vote 
or other means. For blended value businesses, direct engagement offers a way to 
communicate the firm’s mission goals and link those goals to financial performance in 
a way that keeps investors committed to the larger vision of profit with purpose.  
 
At the same time, a formal strategy of investor engagement can provide a way to help 
unify boards that may be made up of diverse investors emphasizing diverse goals. By 
researching investor priorities, understanding their stance on key issues and 
communicating pro-actively about organizational strategy and activity, the 
Conference Board study observes, companies may “reduce or even eliminate” the 
kind of disagreements that can lead to larger problems in the boardroom.
 
This 
approach may serve to help blended value businesses work more effectively with 
investors to protect mission. 
 
Due to its importance to board effectiveness, establishing a direct engagement 
strategy that includes mission is a matter for the board and senior management of 
blended value businesses. Any such strategy needs to answer these questions: 
 
 How will the board and senior management stay abreast of information 
regarding the company’s investors, their investment objectives and position on 
mission-related matters? 
 How will the board and senior management receive feedback from the 
company’s investors about the company’s mission performance?  
 How will the business communicate with investors in a way that takes into 
account both mission delivery and financial performance? 
 
Active communication regarding mission and governance is central to investor 
engagement. At the same time, direct engagement is an opportunity to consistently 
reinforce the connection between good governance, financial performance and 
mission delivery across the entire organization. Investor roadshow presentations and 
Good governance: What impact investors can do   
1. Choose investments that use the new legal forms with robust 
governance and reporting requirements, such as the Benefit 
Corporation. 
2. Choose investments that offer transparency about the role of 
governance with reporting and engagement systems that provide 
needed information. 
3. Employ term sheets that explicitly strengthen impact focus and 
encourage good governance practice. 
4. In director roles, support good governance through your own voting 
and engagement practices. 
5. Build capacity for governance development in investees through 
grants or loans. 
6. Make information about your stance on governance and your 
engagement policies freely available to investees and the public. 
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pitches need to include strong statements concerning mission goals and governance 
arrangements alongside business information. Websites, social media, marketing, 
events, statutory reports and, importantly, personal communications are all 
opportunities to engage investors on mission.  
 
Section V: Performance Monitoring for Mission 
Financial monitoring processes are a ubiquitous part of conventional business 
practice. All for-profit businesses establish more formal systems for monitoring 
financial performance as they grow. Blended value businesses also need to develop 
their processes at this point and, in parallel, they must establish similar systems and 
processes for monitoring mission performance. 
 
Common in the non-profit sector, mission monitoring is still a relatively new 
undertaking for the governing bodies of for-profit businesses. Despite advances in the 
field, such as the development of systems including IRIS and SASB, directors’ efforts 
to monitor mission remain hampered by a lack of standard metrics, equivalent to those 
available in finance, that would allow them to report on mission performance with the 
same certainty they report on financials (Impact Measurement Working Group, 2014).  
 
Delivering impact performance isn’t only a question of having reliable metrics, 
however. The socially beneficial business movement has placed great emphasis on the 
metrics in recent years, and rightly so. Yet it’s important to remember that metrics 
alone won’t deliver mission or prevent mission drift. To have any power, raw metric 
information must be incorporated into the highest oversight and decision-making 
processes of the organization. The governing board must receive it, understand it, 
debate its significance and actively use it to deliver oversight, provide accountability 
and inform strategic decisions.  
 
Mission monitoring is the means by which organizations make the connection 
between impact metrics and leadership and direction. It is emerging as a fundamental 
governance duty for the boards of mission-driven businesses. Robust mission 
performance monitoring systems have been shown to help impact funds deliver on 
mission goals (Clark, Emerson & Thornley 2014). In non-profit governance, mission 
monitoring is a central activity for the governing board and senior leadership of the 
organization (Carver, 1990; Lumley, 2013). Innovative social enterprises are using 
mission monitoring to effectively prevent both mission drift and mission 
abandonment (Alnoor, Battilana & Mair). 
 
Effective mission monitoring requires establishing organizational and governance 
systems and processes that track mission-related activity and its outcomes. 
Establishing these systems or, more precisely, requiring that they be established, is the 
responsibility of the governing board. To succeed, the board and top leadership need 
to: 
 
 Clearly define what mission-related information they will measure; 
 Establish quantifiable, verifiable mission performance goals; 
 Create board-level policies on mission monitoring across the organization; 
 Oversee the formation of monitoring systems including the selection of 
metrics, other measurement methods and key mission performance indicators; 
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 Oversee the development of systems for collecting and reporting mission 
performance information; 
 Formally compare actual performance results to the goals or standards set out 
in their policies.  
 
There is no one-size-fits-all model for mission monitoring. Research indicates that 
different kinds of blended value businesses need to monitor different things in 
different ways (Alnoor, Battilana & Mair, 2014). Thus it is no surprise that the 
monitoring systems used by managers and boards vary according to business size, 
type and location, legal form and governance structure, and the nature of the social or 
environmental mission aims.  
 
Despite this complexity, effective mission monitoring systems do have shared 
characteristics (Epstein & Yuthas, 2014): 
 
1. They originate at the highest strategic level, with the governing board and top 
management. 
2. They align with business and organizational strategy. 
3. They are clear about desired performance results. 
4. They identify performance indicators that can be meaningfully measured or 
evaluated. 
5. They are supported by organizational systems and processes that track 
performance and produce verifiable information. 
6. These are costed and backed with adequate organizational resources. 
 
Merely gathering data isn’t enough. Directors must have accurate mission 
performance information in front of them when they are making decisions. The 
organization needs an internal reporting regime that feeds mission-related 
performance information back into the boardroom where it can inform debate. This 
involves assigning specific accountability for receiving and deliberating on that 
information, perhaps establishing a board-level committee that reports to the whole 
board. And it means preparing and presenting information in a form that can be easily 
understood and used by directors during the course of board deliberations. 6  
 
Again, there’s no standard form for such systems, but those setting them up must 
answer such fundamental questions as: 
 
 Who in the organization will report?  
 To whom will they report?  
 What form will reports take? 
 What will the reporting cycle be? 
 
The mission-related performance data collected through monitoring has another 
important function: It provides the raw material for integrated reporting (see next 
section). In this way, monitoring systems are doubly valuable, supplying the 
                                                     
6 For more in-depth information about metrics, measurement and establishing mission monitoring regimes, see Epstein, M., 
Yuthas, K., (2014) Measuring and Improving Social Impacts: a guide for nonprofits, companies and Impact investors, Jossey-
Bass. 
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information needed for internal decision-making and leadership and at the same time 
providing the basis for effective communication with shareholders, stakeholders and 
the public. 
 
 
Section VI: Reporting for Mission 
Reporting is another activity that can help reinforce mission in growing organizations. 
By taking charge of decisions around reporting, the governing board can turn an 
obligatory duty into an opportunity to preserve and protect mission.  
  
This is truer now than ever, due to changing attitudes about reporting. Expectations 
are shifting to keep up with increased global awareness of the material importance of 
extra-financial elements of firm performance including ESG factors. The Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) has grown up to meet this demand for more transparency. 
Robert Eccles’ and Michael Krzus’ book, One Report, and others on this topic, have 
helped advance the practice of integrated reporting (Eccles & Krzus, 2010). 
Meanwhile, the reporting of extra-financial information is becoming more significant 
as investors increasingly rely on company reports to guide investment decisions 
(Ernst and Young, 2014). 
 
For mission-driven businesses, the move toward integrated reporting has several 
benefits. Integrated reporting provides a way for blended value companies to turn a 
natural commitment to mission into a business advantage. It offers a framework for 
demonstrating the connection between what the business delivers in commercial terms 
and what it provides in terms of social and environmental benefit. When done well, it 
can be a powerful tool for building trust and enhancing reputation while 
demonstrating both mission and financial competence (IIRC, 2014).  
 
Because of this, the choice of what to report and how to report it is an increasingly 
important strategic decision for businesses. As such, it should not be left in the hands 
of PR or marketing departments, as sometimes happens (Epstein, 2014).
 
Rather, the 
decision of how to report should be made by the governing board and senior 
management team (Smith, 2015).  
 
The leaders of blended value businesses need to choose reporting methods that 
demonstrate accountability and provide investors and other stakeholders with reliable 
information about both business and mission performance. External, third party 
verification is becoming more common, as it enhances confidence in the report’s 
quality. Decisions about how to use reported information across all organizational 
communications including websites, social media, press releases, internal training and 
private communications are also matters for strategic oversight.  
 Measuring for mission 
“We need to distinguish how we measure social impact and how we report it. 
Reporting is important, but I firmly believe that organizations must get the 
measurements right for their own purposes, for internal reporting and 
decision-making, before they worry about reporting.” (Epstein, 2014) 
 
Mark Epstein, author of Measuring and Improving Social Impacts 
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With the GRI’s G4 Guidelines7 and the IIRC’s Integrated Reporting Framework8 now 
available, companies now have more reporting choices than ever. Choosing reporting 
methods strategically, devoting adequate resources to reporting, and following 
through on disclosure across financial and non-financial information, will benefit both 
mission and growth in blended value organizations.   
Section VII: Formalizing Board and Executive Accountability  
The rise of integrated reporting and increased investor focus on extra-financial factors 
are symptomatic of a new global attitude toward business also reflected by the impact 
investing movement. As more companies adopt ESG standards and seek to deliver 
some kind of benefit along with profit, factors that were once at best marginal to 
strategic direction are becoming central to it. As a result, companies are now making 
governors and executives formally accountable for areas of extra-financial 
performance. 
 
One important example of this trend is provided by research from Ceres, an advocacy 
organization for sustainability leadership, into the evolution of sustainability practice 
in companies (Ceres, 2014; Ceres & Ramani, 2015). In an effort to understand what 
makes some companies more effective when it comes to delivering sustainability 
performance, Ceres has increasingly focused its studies on how boards and directors 
provide oversight for sustainability. They found companies 
responding to the increasing pressure to deliver on sustainability by making both 
executives and governing boards formally accountable for sustainability performance.  
 
It should be acknowledged that Ceres’ research focuses on large companies with 
highly developed governance systems. The findings, however, indicate a direction of 
travel for governance practice that has relevance for smaller and growing businesses 
with mission aims. Measures implemented include: 
 
A board-level oversight committee with a written charter:  Almost a third of 
Ceres’ surveyed organizations in Tier 1 and 2 had formalized board accountability for 
sustainability by establishing “a written board committee charter that…formalizes 
expectations and ensures continuity of commitment for sustainability regardless of 
board or management turnover.” Additionally, 27% of companies in Tier 1 had formal 
board oversight in the form of committee charters for both social and environmental 
sustainability issues.  
                                                     
7 For more information about the GRI see their website: https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Assurance.pdf 
8 For more, see the IIRC website: http://www.theiirc.org 
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A management committee for sustainability: A quarter of companies in Ceres’ 
survey create a management committee “chaired by the CEO or other C-suite 
executive and comprising senior level executives from across the enterprise.” Such a 
committee provides an effective mechanism for integrating sustainability into 
strategy, planning and operations. 
 
Tying sustainability performance to executive compensation: Almost a quarter of 
companies Ceres’ survey link executive compensation with some sustainability 
metrics, though with varying degrees of transparency. 7% of companies in Tiers 1 and 
2 go farther, making explicit links between compensation practices and public 
disclosed sustainability targets. 3% in Tier 1 link compensation to sustainability 
performance targets that go beyond goals driven by required compliance with laws 
and regulations.
 
 
 
Including sustainability in all policies and risk management systems: Companies 
are increasingly establishing formal sustainability policies and integrating 
sustainability criteria into risk management systems, the report found. 19% of Tier 1 
and 2 companies, adopted formal policies related to sector-specific social and 
environmental issues and had systems in place for implementing those policies.  
 
 
 
Skills in the boardroom 
“In the US we’ve seen that many companies do have sustainability committees 
with written charters. Yet to be effective they also need to have the right people 
on those committees. The board skills matrix—the list of skills a board needs—
must have sustainability oversight skills embedded in it. In addition to hiring 
business expertise, companies need to make parallel efforts to identify and hire 
board members with sustainability skills.” (Ramani, 2015) 
 
Veena Ramani, Senior Director, Corporate Program, Ceres 
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Recommendations  
As this paper has tried to demonstrate, businesses in several sectors, coming at this 
issue from a range of different perspectives, are finding that governance practice can 
provide a framework for building mission into the DNA of organizations. However, 
this short paper only scratches the surface of what is already a developing field.  
 
To take this inquiry further, we recommend more research to capture current learning 
across sectors and to identify mission-supportive governance practice as it evolves.  
Sharing this information with budding social entrepreneurs, MBA students and 
investors, thereby increasing their understanding of the potential of governance to 
provide solutions to mission challenges, could help develop more sophisticated 
attitude toward the role of governance across the sector. 
 
Additionally, more research into some of the areas flagged in this paper could yield 
important insights. Mission monitoring is one of them. More research is needed into 
how organizations develop the kind of monitoring systems that make practical use of 
metrics and enable governing boards and managers to evaluate mission alongside 
financial performance—and so to deliver oversight and accountability in both areas.  
 
Investor engagement is another area where more research could be beneficial. As the 
sector continues to expand into the mainstream, new kinds of investors will be joining 
the boards of growing blended value businesses and exerting their influence. More 
work on how the leaders of these businesses—governing boards and top managers—
can create pro-active strategies to identify investors who will align with mission and 
negotiate favorable terms for mission preservation, would be welcome.  More 
research into how investors behave in governance roles, and the impact that has on 
mission preservation, could yield clues as to why so many businesses find mission 
pushed to the margins as they grow. There is also room for developing practical 
resources to help businesses establish effective investor engagement and 
communication strategies.  
 
Board composition and recruitment in mission driven businesses is another area ripe 
for study.  It stands to reason that blended value businesses need more than 
conventional business expertise on their governing boards and in their senior 
management teams. They need “multi-lingual” individuals who support the mission 
and understand the relationship between the business and the benefit it delivers. 
Advisory committees and advisory boards also require the right people if they are to 
deliver value. And finding an experienced, mission-wise chair can be key both to the 
effective functioning of the board and to the preservation of mission.  
 
As the sector matures, the pool of professionals with “multi-lingual” skills is growing, 
but finding the right people remains challenging for businesses in the hectic scaling 
stage. Wider use of skills matrices—and matrices developed especially for mission-
driven businesses—could help. A specialist referral service, online skills bank or 
recruiting agency could be established to put growing businesses in touch with 
appropriate candidates.  Gathering and sharing the experiences of board members, and 
especially of chairs of blended value businesses, could speed sector learning and 
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support the professional development of a new generation of blended value business 
leaders.  
Conclusion 
Mission-supportive legal forms—including the evolving field of hybrid and tandem 
forms as well as other innovative adaptations to traditional forms—are an essential 
starting point for creating new kinds of blended value businesses. Equally, broad 
infrastructural and structural changes, such as those recommended by the Impact G8 
Taskforce, will be necessary if we are to establish a climate where businesses with 
mission aims can thrive and grow to scale. Much valuable work has been done in both 
these areas and research into solutions continues. 
 
However, legal and infrastructural solutions can only provide part of the answer to the 
question of how to preserve mission in the growth stage. We suggest that another part 
of the solution may lie deep within the strategic heart of organizations, within the 
systems and processes through which governing boards provide oversight and 
accountability to the businesses they lead.  While the growth stage brings many 
challenges, it also offers opportunities for building mission into the very fabric of 
governance systems, and thereby helping embed it in the DNA of the business even as 
it scales up.   
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